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Abstract 
 
OpenSST  is a protocol for secured electronic 
transactions. This article presents an experimental 
prototype of the OpenSST protocol within the framework 
of electronic transactions. It will be an e-Business 
architecture around which a component is graft in 
charge of executing authorization requests for electronic 
payments. This architecture is already deployed on an e-
Business platform (EBSME : Electronic Business for 
SME’s). Most often a leased line ensure the clearing 
communication support (authorization requests). In 
addition to the fact of using the Internet to proceed the 
banking authorizations of payment, adopting OpenSST 
as the basic protocol for the transport of the 
authorization of payment messages get us the following 
advantages: safety, simplicity and open source. 
OpenSST was developed to answer three major 
requirements. The first requirement was to reach a high 
security level. This security is based in term of 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation. The second requirement was the needed 
simplicity in software engineering, which proves to be a 
significant factor for the design of information systems. 
The third and the last major requirement was the ability 
to accept and use existing standards in order to ensure 
an easy interfacing with other solutions. To reach these 
exigencies, the OpenSST protocol was build on a 
standardized message format, which is composed in one 
part by a message structure, and on the other part by the 
operation of the protocol. 
1
2
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The payment of electronic transactions is getting a 
continuous growth for several years. Closely related to 
the development of the e-commerce, the needs in 
transactional security, like the digital signature on the 
client side or the non-repudiation, seems to be critical 
                                                 
1 Open Simple Secure Transaction 
2 EBSME (Electronic Business for SME’s) was developed within the 
framework of an FNR (National Fund of Research) project called 
ACCES-PME (Adoption de Compétences interdisciplinaires pour le 
Commerce Electronique Sécurisé des PME) from the CITI – The CITI, 
Innovation Center by Information Technologies- is a structure of the 
Public Research Center Henri Tudor (www.tudor.lu) dedicated to the 
innovation by the information systems. The CRPHT, associated with 
the Luxembourg University of Applied Sciences within the framework 
of the Campus of Technology of Luxembourg-Kirchberg, is entirely 
centered on the technological engineering and applications. 
for the use and the viability of e-business transactions 
over the Internet or open networks.  
Several activities are achieved in the domain of 
electronic transactions. Indeed, the solutions and 
protocols are mainly of two types: proprietary or Open 
Source. The majority of the economical sectors3 do not 
accept an opaque solution. The source code of the 
solution must be auditable in order to be able to ensure 
its integrity in term of security and operation.  
This article is focused on the development of a 
clearing mechanism based on an open source protocol 
called OpenSST. It is organized as follows. The next 
section presents the state of the art regarding to the 
existing payment protocols and secure solutions of 
electronic transactions. The third section is dedicated to 
the detailed presentation of the OpenSST protocol.  And 
the final part describing the experimentation within the 
framework of an e-Business clearing solution 
architecture and more particularly for the development 
of the authorization part of banking payment. 
 
2. State of the art 
 
In the following we will present three of the most 
representative solutions of the current market in the 
domain of the electronic transactions, namely: HTTP/S, 
SET and ECASH. 
 
2.1. HTTP/S 
 
HTTP/S (HTTP on SSL/TLS) is a protocol, which 
consists in securing the communication channel between 
two computers. It guarantees the identity of the visited 
website and the confidentiality of the transactions. 
However, operating on the transport layer, and not inside 
the session, doesn't make possible to check a signature 
when the session is closed. So, SSL doesn't support the 
signature of transactions, but only the non-repudiation of 
the session itself. If the majority of the trading websites 
can work without these properties, this is not the case for 
other applications for which this function is of primary 
importance. Except the transparency aspect on the 
application level, this protocol dissociates itself by its 
simplicity, performance and popularity. Nevertheless is 
remains used mainly in a unilateral mechanism of 
authentication. SET 
SET is the product of the association of the two 
largest world organizations, which deliver credit cards: 
Visa and MasterCard. This protocol manages 
                                                 
3 financial, military or public institutions 
exclusively the payment of transactions. The strong 
security (confidentiality, authentication, integrity and 
non-repudiation) guaranteed by SET is based on many 
cryptographic techniques and algorithms such as MD5, 
SHA, dual signatures, RSA and on the separation of 
purchase details and the financial transaction. Therefore 
the merchant can't have access to the banking data of the 
customer. In the same way, the bank of the merchant 
can't see the details of the progressing commercial 
transaction. However SET presents the disadvantage to 
be a slow and complex protocol, difficult to implement. 
The price of its implementation and its rigidity makes 
SET to be used for large accounts. 
 
2.2. Ecash  
 
Ecash is a payment system launched by DigiCash, 
pioneer in the model of electronic cash. The principle of 
this model rests on an order of electronic coins by a 
purchaser to the Ecash bank. These coins can then be 
spent in an anonymous way in online shops. A database 
updated by the Ecash bank remembers the number of 
coins already spent so that same coins couldn't be spent 
twice. On a large scale, the Ecash model could have 
weaknesses, more particularly time delays, caused by the 
large number of database accesses done during the 
validation of the transaction. This proprietary solution 
also forces the couple salesman/purchaser to have each 
one an account in the same Ecash bank. 
Among the existing solutions and protocols, there is 
not solution that meets at the same time all the 
requirements in term of security, independence towards 
supplier, availability of the source code and 
independence in term of platform. The solutions 
available are either cheap, easy to implement and 
incomplete or complete but difficult to deploy, complex 
and expensive. The analysis of this level of 
completeness of the protocols and solutions puts forward 
that secure transactions are based either on the transport 
layer (for example the SSL/TLS or SSH protocols) or on 
the message itself (for example the OpenPGP protocol). 
 
3. OpenSST protocol 
 
OpenSST was developed to answer three major 
requirements. The first requirement was to reach a high 
level of security. This security is based in term of 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation. The second requirement was the needed 
simplicity in software engineering, which proves to be a 
significant factor for the design of information systems. 
The third and the last major requirement was the ability 
to accept and use existing standards in order to ensure an 
easy interfacing with other solutions. To reach these 
exigencies, the OpenSST protocol was build on a 
standardized message format, which is composed in one 
part by a message structure, and on the other part by the 
operation of the protocol. 
 
3.1. OpenSST message format 
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<opensst version=“…” xmlns=“…” …> 
<encryption type=“…” …/> 
<data destination=“…” …> 
… 
</data> 
<signature type=“…” …> 
… 
</signature> 
<tid server="…" client="…"/> 
<timestamp type="…"/> e message format of OpenSST is based on a simple 
daptable structure according to the needs of the 
It's presented in the form of a XML document, 
 confers the characteristics of being evolutionary 
ortable. The message is composed in three parts:  
cryption part, a data part and a signature part. 
e "encryption" element defines the used 
ographic algorithm, the "padding" methods and the 
ting mode as a hybrid cryptographic system or not.  
element can appear 0 to N times in the same 
SST message. 
Figure 1: Message format of OpenSST 
e "data" element contains the data transmitted by 
ransaction. The various attributes of this element 
e amongst other things:  the encoding type of the 
nt (for example: Base 64) and the message type 
xample: specific data, a key generation message, an 
f session message, etc.). The coding of the message 
 effective in the "data" element, this element can 
integrate elements such as "tid", "timestamp" or 
 types according to the type of the message itself.  
ary to the "encryption" and "signature" elements, 
data" element cannot appear more than once in an 
SST message. 
e "signature" element contains the signature of the 
" part. The various attributes of this element define 
ype and the method of signature. The element 
ture can appear 0 to N times in the same OpenSST 
age. 
penSST message types 
rious message types are defined (figure 2), namely:  
CreateSession,  
KeyEnrollment,  
Authentication,  
DataExchange and  
 KillSession. 
e "CreateSession" message type aims to initialize 
ransaction. Among others this message sends the 
c key of the "OpenSST server" to the "OpenSST 
", the creation and exchange of session keys and 
uthentication of the "OpenSST server" to the 
nSST proxy". The beginning of the transaction 
passes by the following stages:  the sending of a 
message by the "proxy" to the "server" with a minimum 
of data to obtain its public key4, then the generation and 
transmission of a session key to the "server" by the 
"proxy"56. After the transaction is initiated, all the 
messages between the "proxy" and the "server" are 
encrypted with the session key. The function of the 
"KeyEnrollment" message is to provide to the 
"OpenSST server" the public key of the customer. This 
message is send only once; the first time a transaction is 
done between the customer and the site proposing the 
electronic payment. Considering that the customer 
received by a secure way an "userid" and a "pincode" 
from "server", the "proxy" generates a pair of keys and 
sends to the "server" by a "KeyEnrollment" message 
containing the userid, the public key and a one-time 
password (OTP), which is a HMAC of the PINCODE 
and the public key7. The "server" answers the "proxy" by 
sending the result of the operation. 
The authentication of the "proxy" must be carried out 
with each opening of an OpenSST session. With this 
intention, the "proxy" transmits to the server a signed 
"Authentication" message containing the "userid" of the 
customer.  The server seeks in its database the public 
key corresponding to this "userid" and checks the 
signature. After this, the server communicates the result 
of the authentication to the "proxy". Once the user is 
duly authenticated, the "DataExchange" messages 
exchanged between the "proxy" and the "server" 
contains nothing else than HTTP requests and HTML 
responses (major part of the cases) but can also contain 
images, CSS, Javascripts, etc.... With each HTTP 
request carried out by the browser, the "proxy" sends a 
message to the "server" and receives in response of this a 
message containing the required webpage. A request for 
a simple webpage can generate several subjacent 
requests to obtain the images, the style sheets, etc. 
Finally the "KillSession" message type is used, as its 
name indicates, to close the session.  The customer sends 
just an empty "KillSession" message to the "server". The 
response of the "server" contains a code of success or 
failure and a message to communicate the result of the 
closing of the session to the proxy. 
                                                 
4 The "type" attribute of the "data" part is set to "sessionSetup1" 
5 Session key encrypted with the public key of the "server" 
6 The "type" attribute of the "data" part is set to "sessionSetup2" 
7 OTP = HMAC(PINcode, PuK) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Stages of the attributes schematically 
illustration 
 
4. Experimentation of OpenSST 
 
4.1. Online e-Business application 
 
The deployment of OpenSST within the framework 
of e-Business transactions is based on three key 
elements, namely: 
! an OpenSST proxy,  
! a reverse OpenSST proxy, 
! an OpenSST server.  
The figure below shows these three elements in a 
global architecture. 
 
 
Figure 3: Global architecture of OpenSST 
 
The transactions between these elements are 
forwarded by the HTTP protocol.. The "proxy" is 
installed on the browser of the customer. It intercepts the 
requests carried out by the browser, converts them to the 
OpenSST format and transmits them to the "reverse 
proxy". The "reverse proxy", generally integrated on the 
infrastructure of the tradesman, intercepts the OpenSST 
messages coming from "proxy" and checks its syntax but 
not its semantic to ensure that the messages are well 
structured. If the message format is correct, it is 
transmitted to the "server" for treatment. In the contrary 
case, the "reverse proxy" transmits to the "proxy" a 
HTTP message containing an error code. This can be the 
case for example: a message modification by an 
unauthorized person when it is send over the network, a 
malformed message done by a bugged program or a 
"buffer overflow" attack. The "server" receives the 
OpenSST message with validated syntax, decrypts the 
initial HTTP request and transmits it to the web server. 
The web server doesn't notice the used security 
mechanisms. The operation is completely transparent for 
the customer and the tradesman 
 
4.2. Concept of "Clearing" 
 
There are several definitions of the "Clearing" term: 
! clearing can be most simply understood as the 
stage in the process after a transaction has 
occurred but before a portfolio has been 
completely adjusted and all payments 
(settlement) have been made. 
! the verification of information between the two 
brokers in a securities transaction and the 
subsequent settlement (delivery of certificates 
in exchange for payment). 
On the other hand, a Clearinghouse is a company, 
which serves at the same time as a postman, which 
transports the money or the values (actions or 
obligations) when they change the owner, and a "notary" 
of these operations, which carefully preserves the trace 
for its customers in the case of dispute. Thanks to the 
power of the Clearinghouses, the ownership of certain 
securities can change thirty times in the same day and 
travel in ten money markets. From a general point of 
view the mechanism of clearing can be subdivided in 
two principal levels. A schematized example of such a 
system is shown in the following figure. 
In the case of the electronic payments (Level 0), the 
merchants carry out at the time of the purchase only 
authorization of payment requests.  The merchant asks 
an intermediary, in this case a Clearinghouse, if the 
customer has or not the necessary budget for the 
purchase. During all this activity (over one working day 
for example) the merchant memorizes locally the various 
transactions via a backup system. Then (Level 1), the 
merchant sends periodically (at the end of the day for 
example) via mail (or other) a summary of all the 
purchases carried out to his intermediary. The 
intermediary (Clearinghouse) will carry out the money 
transfers from the various customers towards the account 
of the merchant. 
 
 
Figure 4: General sight of a "Clearing" 
architecture 
 
Only the "Clearing" part applied to the transactions of 
electronic payments will be treated in this article. 
Indeed, at the time of purchase, only the authorization of 
payment request is done. 
This procedure proceeds in several stages. To 
illustrate these stages as well as possible, let us take the 
case of a person who carries out an online purchase. The 
collected information about the customer by the 
tradesman is send to a clearing service more precisely a 
clearing member. This member will check the amount of 
the purchase. If the sum doesn't exceed a certain limit, 
then the authorization request is directly accepted on this 
level.. If the sum of the purchase exceeds the imposed 
limit, a choice must be done according to the clearing 
type: national or international clearing. We are talking 
about national clearing when the credit card is emitted in 
the same country as where the transaction is carried out. 
Than the member has the means of treating the 
authorization request directly (direct bonds with the 
national banks). International clearing is done when the 
credit card is emitted in another country as the country 
where the transaction is carried out. In this case the 
clearing member that authorize the transaction request to 
an international intermediary (Visa, Mastercard), which 
delegate the request to the bank emit the credit card. 
The verifications done by the customer bank during 
an authorization request are as follows (according to the 
country): 
! existence of the credit card by its number, 
! expiration date of the credit card, 
! solvency of the client's account and checking if 
the client's account is not blocked 
! exceed of the imposed limit 
After having carried out these various controls, the 
response and the decision of the bank are emitted to the 
transmitter of the authorization request. 
 
4.3. Prototype 
 
The CITI has developed a prototype that will carry 
out part of the clearing (authorization requests) of 
electronic payments done by credit cards. The 
communication between the user interface and the 
EBSME platform [10] and this clearing gateway will be 
secured by the OpenSST protocol.  
The various OpenSST modules such as the "OpenSST 
proxy", the "OpenSST reverse proxy" and the 
"OpenSST server" which make the prototype, will be 
deployed on two levels (see figure hereafter), namely: 
! on the e-commerce platform (EBSME) hosted 
by an ASP8, 
! on a clearing member. 
 
4.3.1. Global architecture 
 
The following diagram illustrates the existing 
architecture of EBSME including the clearing module 
needed for the use of the OpenSST protocol. 
On figure 5, we can find three main parts; customers, 
tradesmen and clearing services. The customers are 
using a protected Internet connection (SSL in this case) 
                                                 
8 Application Service Provider 
to communicate with e-commerce application, which 
uses an Internet connection secured via OpenSST 
(object of our experimentation). The use of OpenSST 
imposes the use of API's in relation with the EBSME 
platform (OpenSST proxy) and with the platform of the 
clearing member (Reverse OpenSST proxy and 
OpenSST server). All the modules are written in Java. In 
the same way the used encryption library "Bouncy 
Castle” provider is associated within the "JCE" 
framework. 
 
4.3.2 Clearing messages: content of data part 
 
We distinguish five principal message types to send 
to the server of the clearing bank, namely: 
! authorization request, 
! authorization request repeat, 
! authorization request response, 
! authorization reversal request, 
!  
These message types represent only those, which are 
necessary for the authorization request of payment 
whose complete list appears in the ISO8583 [12] 
standard. The various messages are sent in XML form in 
the "data" part of the OpenSST message. In the figure 5, 
we present the contents of the "data" part for the 
authorization request message types for online 
payments.
authorization reversal request response.
 
 
 Figure 5: Diagram of the architecture of EBSME 
 
<datadestination="http://clearing_server" encoding="base64" 
 type="e-transaction"> 
<msg> 0100 </msg> 
<002>  <!-- Primary Account Number -->     </002> 
<003>  <!-- Processing Code -->     </003> 
<004>  <!-- Amount of the transaction -->    </004> 
<007>  <!-- Transmission Date/Time -->    </007> 
<011> <!-- System Trace Audit Number -->    </011> 
<012>  <!-- Time, Local transaction -->    </012> 
<013>  <!-- Date, Local transaction -->    </013> 
<014>  <!-- Date, Expiration -->     </014> 
<018>  <!-- Merchant category code -->     </018> 
<019>  <!-- Acquiring Institution country code --></019> 
<022>  <!-- POS entry mode -->     </022> 
<025>  <!-- POS condition mode -->     </025> 
<035>  <!-- Track 2 Data -->     </035> 
<037>  <!-- Retrieval Reference Number -->    </037> 
<041>  <!-- CATI -->      </041> 
<042>  <!-- CAIC -->      </042> 
<049>  <!-- Currency Code of the Transaction --> </049> 
</data> 
 
Explanation of the various tags: 
 
msg: Allows determining the message type 
002: Usually named PAN, it's a variable number with a 
maximum of 19 digits (usually 14 or 16 digits) retrieved 
from magnetic cards. This number allows determining 
the emitter of the credit card and the account of the 
cardholder. This number also contains a "check digit" 
which makes it possible to check the validity of the 
account from cardholder. 
003: Defines the transaction type to carry out.  
004: The real amount of the transaction in the local 
currency. 
007: Date/Time of the transmitted transaction. Format: 
MMDDhhmmss 
011: The "System Trace Audit number" is a number 
between 000001 and 999999 that is generated by the 
point of sales(POS) and which remains the same during 
all the transaction (messages 0100, 0101 et 0110). The 
0400 message has always a different STAN number, 
which is incremented after each transaction. 
012: Local transaction time. Format: hhmmss 
013: Local transaction date. Format: MMDD 
014: Expiration date of the credit card. This value is 
retrieved from magnetic card.  Format: YYMM 
018: Merchant category code. 
019: Code that identifies the country of the purchaser. 
For further details are available in the ISO3166 standard. 
022: Allows knowing how the credit card was used 
(with or without pin-code). 
025: Allows knowing how the transaction was carried 
out (presence of the customer…). 
035: Contains the information from the track no.2 of the 
magnetic tape of the credit card. 
037: It contains a unique number generated by the point 
of sales (POS), which makes it possible to identify a 
transaction. This value used in the 0100 and 0400 
messages. This number is composed of two digits, which 
identify the company, four digits, which identify the 
used terminal, and six digits that correspond to STAN 
number. 
041: Contains a value, which identifies the used 
terminal. A "company code" (two digits), the terminal 
identifier (four digits) and the identifier of the used 
device (two digits) compose this value  
042: CAIC = Card acceptor terminal identification. It's a 
unique code that identifies the terminal where the credit 
card was introduced. 
049: Indicate the monetary currency used for the 
transaction. 
The various encryption algorithms and supported 
signatures within the framework of this experimentation 
and the OpenSST prototype are gathered in the sections 
below 
 
4.3.2 Clearing messages: content of encryption part 
 
This table is used to determine the argument "type" of 
the element "encryption" of the OpenSST message. The 
argument "type" is made up in the following way: 
 
[SESSIONTYPE]-[ENCRYPTIONTYPE]-
[ENCRYPTIONMODE]-[PADDINGMODE]-
[PADDINGSESSION]-[PADDINGCRYPTION]-
[LENGHT] 
 
ENCRYPTIONTYPE ID  PADDING ID 
Null 0  Null 0 
DES 1  Zero 1 
IDEA 2  PCKS#1 (1.5) 2 
3DES 3  PCKS#5 
(RFC1423) 
3 
RC5 4  ISO 9796 #1 4 
CAST 5  ISO 9796 #2 5 
BLOWFISH 6  ISO 9796 #3 6 
TWOFISH 7  PCKS#1 – OAEP 7 
AES 8  IEEE OAEP 8 
   ISO 10126 9 
ENCRYPTIONMODE   ANSI X9.23 10 
Null 0    
ECB 1  SESSIONTYPE  
CBC 2  Null 0 
CFB 3  Per-shared key 1 
OFB 4  DSS 2 
NOFB 5  RSA 3 
STREAM 6    
 
4.3.2 Clearing messages: content of signature part 
 
This table is used to determine the argument "type" of 
the element "signature" of the OpenSST message. The 
argument "type" is made up in the following way: 
 
[SIGNATURETYPE]-[HASHTYPE]-
[SIGENCRYPTIONTYPE]-[ENCRYPTIONMODE]-
[PADDING]-[LENGHT] 
 
SIGNATURETYPE ID  PADDING ID 
Null 0  Null 0 
Public key 1  Zero 1 
   PCKS#1 (1.5) 2 
HASHTYPE   PCKS#5 (RFC1423) 3 
Null 0  ISO 9796 #1 4 
MD5 1  ISO 9796 #2 5 
SHA1 2  ISO 9796 #3 6 
   PCKS#1 – OAEP 7 
ENCRYPTIONMODE ID  IEEE OAEP 8 
Null 0  ISO 10126 9 
ECB 1  ANSI X9.23 10 
CBC 2    
CFB 3  SIGENCRYPTION 
TYPE 
 
OFB 4    
NOFB 5  Null 0 
STREAM 6  DSS 1 
   RSA 2 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the existent protocols and solutions 
for secure electronic transactions puts forward that it 
doesn't exist a solution which offers all at the same time, 
a high level of security, an insurance for perennial 
systems, the possibility to audit the code and a malleable 
message format.  
As a consequence of what was mentioned above, a 
partnership of companies9 developed the OpenSST 
protocol. This protocol answers three major 
requirements that are: 
! a high level of security in term of 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication and 
non-repudiation, 
! the simplicity compared to software 
engineering, 
! and the ability to accept and use existing 
standards. 
Experiments carried out and presented in this article 
show that the OpenSST protocol can be applied even to 
domains, which require a strong robustness and speed 
like the clearing domain. OpenSST robustness and the 
quality of its development will make complementary 
researches and implementations in various future 
projects in order to adapt it to the needs of secured 
information technology. 
6. References 
 
[1] T. Dierks, C. Allen, “The TLS Protocol version 1.0”, 
Internet Engineering Task Force, January 1999. 
 
[2] A. Dulaunoy, T. Fruru et S. Stormacq, “OpenSST 
Message Format”, Internet Drafts, December 2002. 
 
[3] S. Stormacq, “OpenSST Message Type: HTTP 
proxy”, Internet Drafts, December 2002. 
 
[4] Proposed : A. Dulaunoy, S. Stormacq, “OpenSST : 
Open Simple Secure Transaction : Une approche de 
réduction de la complexité pour les transactions 
électroniques”, January 2003. 
 
[5] Ph. Oechslin, Quelques notions de cryptographie, 
http://lasecwww.eppfl.ch/securitereseaux/files/s1_07.pdf  
 
[6] M. Pablos Martin, T. Pinxteren, P. Robert, Sécurité 
du commerce électronique, 
                                                 
9 Aubay Luxembourg SA, Conostix  SA and the CRP 
Henri Tudor 
http://www.tele.ucl.ac.be/ELEC2920/2000/E-
Commerce/secu_et_e-commerce.html  
 
[7] D. O’Mahony, M. Peirce, H. Tewari, Electronic 
Payment Systems for E-Commerce, second edition, 
Artech House, 2001. 
 
[8] http://www.opensst.org/  
 
[9] Alexandre Dulaunoy, Sébastien Stormacq - 
OpenSST : “Open Simple Secure Transaction, Une 
approche de réduction de la complexité pour les 
transactions électroniques”. SAR 2003, 30 July – June 
2003. Marrakech, Maroc. 
 
[10] Djamel Khadraoui, Eric Dubois, “B2B eContract 
Solution for Teleservices”. International Conference on 
Intelligent Agents, WEB Technologies and Internet 
Commerce – IAWTIC’2003, 12-14 February 2003, page 
185. 
 
[11] CEntre de TRansferts Electroniques: 
http://www.cetrel.lu  
 
[12] International Organization for Standardization:  
http://www.iso.ch 
 
[13] Alexandre Dulaunoy, Sebastien Stormacq, 2002. 
“OpenSST: Open Simply Secure Transaction”. URL: 
http://www.foo.be/current/opensst/ 
 
[14] Alexandre Dulaunoy, April 2002. “A XML Schema 
for the OpenSST message format”. Internal Conostix 
document. 
 
[15] Robert L. Ziegler, Linux Sécurité, CampusPress, 
France, 2000 
 
[16] Damel Khadraoui, “OpenSST - Basic clearing 
mechanism for online web applications”, LinuxDays, 
Luxembourg, 2003. 
